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Abstract 
The purpose of this master thesis is to examine how management compensation 
affects the usage of financial derivatives. The study focused on non-financial 
firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange with the data collected manually from 
annual reports for the year 2011. We find evidence that the ownership of stocks 
options by CEOs of those companies has a significant negative effect on the usage 
of financial derivatives.  We also tested whether the ownership of shares by CEOs 
or bonus payments received by CEOs affect the use of financial derivative. 
Although the results were not robust, we observed a positive relation between 
these variables and the usage of financial derivatives.  
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1. Introduction 
Managing risk is an important topic in finance. It has been increasingly common 
among companies to reduce their risk exposure in order to have more stable cash- 
flows. Depending on their attitudes toward risk, firms often use financial 
derivatives as a risk management instrument. The risk firms often face is 
associated with foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity prices. Most 
common derivatives firms use to reduce these types of exposure are 
forwards/futures, options and swaps (Bank for International Settlements 2013). 
 
Although risk management is important for so many firms, research regarding risk 
management in Norway is limited. Børsum and Ødegaard (2005) summarize a 
questionnaire conducted by the Norwegian Central Bank in 2004. The 
questionnaire focused on the usage of currency derivatives by Norwegian 
companies. However, Børsum and Ødegaard (2005) did not investigate 
managerial behaviour concerning risk management. In this thesis, we examine 
how management compensation affects the usage of financial derivatives among 
companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
 
To answer our main research problem we created three different hypotheses, 
which we then tested. First, we looked at whether stock options had a negative 
impact on the usage of financial instruments. Theory suggests that a manager who 
receives compensation based on stock options in relation to the firm value would 
be more risk seeking and would hedge less (Tufano 1996; Rogers 2002). Second, 
we considered whether bonus payments based on accounting earnings had an 
impact on the usage of financial derivatives. Bonus payments based on accounting 
earnings often face a target and a cap. Normally a cap is restricted to no more than 
50% of the fixed salary. Bonus payments with a target and a cap could create 
incentive and disincentive for hedging activities. Kim, Nam and Thornton (2008) 
found evidence that managers who were not expecting to reach the cap were 
hedging less than managers who were expecting to reach the cap. Finally, we 
examined whether management compensation based on shares had a positive 
effect on the usage of financial derivatives. Managers who hold shares would have 
a utility function of the firm value that would be closer to the shareholders utility 
function. Therefore, they will hedge more (Tufano 1996; Rogers 2002).  
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Our hypotheses are mainly based on the theory presented by Smith and Stulz 
(1985). Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that a managerial compensation contract, 
which may include stock options, ownership stocks and bonus plan, could be one 
reason why companies may or may not use risk management instruments. 
Shareholders are interested in maximizing the value of their firm’s shares, 
whereas managers are interested to maximizing their own utility. By relating 
managerial compensation to some measure of value, managers’ financial 
wellbeing will depend on how the company is doing and thus affect their attitude 
toward the usage of risk management instruments. In addition, we considered 
whether firm size, capital structure, industry and CEOs education background 
affects the use of financial derivatives.  
 
We find a significant negative relation between CEOs who hold stock options and 
the usage of financial derivatives. There was a positive relation between CEOs 
who hold shares and the use of financial derivatives. However, the result was not 
significant. Both of the coefficients to the variables had signs that we were 
expected. Bonus payments had a positive relation on the usage of financial 
derivatives, but it was not significant.  
 
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. In section I, we consider 
theory and existing research on different compensation schemes and the effects 
they have on the usage of financial derivatives. In section II, we present our main 
hypothesis. In section III, we describe our data and the methodology. In section 
IV, we deliver our main results and a robustness check. Finally, in section V, we 
present our conclusion. 
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2. Theory and literature review 
According to Stulz (2003), derivatives markets can be traced back to the 17th 
century, when Holland had its own market for tulip options and Japan had a 
futures market for rice. However, it was not until late in the 20th century that the 
derivatives markets really took off. Today derivatives markets are widely known 
and companies use derivatives to reduce their exposure to risk. 
 
Research on the use of risk management by firms has been done for many years, 
and we can divide the evidence into two different types. The first type is evidence 
based on surveys, and the second type is evidence based on analysis of firm-
specific data. Regardless of the types, research indicates that companies that use 
derivatives have higher value and lower cash-flow volatility (Stulz 2003, 630). 
 
Dolde (1993) created a questionnaire, which he sent out to all Fortune 500 firms. 
Out of all companies which responded (244 companies in total), approximately 
85% used some sort of derivatives to manage financial risks. Also, larger firms 
had a significantly higher probability of using derivatives. However, smaller firms 
that used derivatives usually hedged a greater portion of their exposures. Other 
well-known surveys on financial risk management are the Wharton studies done 
by Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1995; 1998). The studies focused on the usage of 
derivatives among non-financial firms in the US. These findings support the 
results done by Dolde (1993), that the use of derivatives is more common for 
larger firms. Only 13% of the firms with a market value below 50 million USD 
used financial derivatives.   
 
Since requirements regarding reporting standards for firms have increased in the 
last years, it is now possible to read about the use of derivatives in the annual 
reports published by firms. Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) used this method 
to study publicly traded Fortune 500 firms. Their results indicated that 56% of 
companies in their sample used some sort of derivatives 
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2.1. Shareholder theory and empirical evidence 
Classical finance theories suggest that risk management does not create value. 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), risk management is irrelevant to firms 
because shareholders can do it on their own. This theory assumes that the capital 
market is perfect and there are no contracting costs or taxes. However, Modigliani 
and Miller (1963) recognize the tax benefit of interest rate paid on debt. The firm 
value will increase with increasing leverage because of the advantage of a debt tax 
shield. Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) draw attention to bankruptcy costs.  These 
authors recognize the advantage of leverage but also bring up the costs associated 
with leverage, bankruptcy and the financial distress cost of debt. The marginal 
benefit of debt will then be a decreasing function of debt. Smith and Stulz (1985) 
argue that a transactional cost of bankruptcy encourages firms to hedge. Hedging 
reduces the likelihood of a firm ending up in a situation of financial distress, 
which gives the firm an opportunity to increase debt and take advantage of a debt 
tax shield. 
 
Smith and Stulz (1985) also argue that risk management has an impact on tax 
payments. In a situation with a convex tax function, a firm can use financial 
derivatives to reduce the expected tax liabilities by smooth the taxable income. 
 
Graham and Rogers (2002) tested Smith and Stulz (1985) argument about the 
convex tax payment. They did not find any evidence that supported this argument. 
However, they did find that hedging increased debt capacity, reduced cost of 
financial distress and that a firm’s size has impact on the hedging activity. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) managed to test whether financial derivatives 
created value for firms facing currency exchange risk. They discovered that 
derivative users had on average 4.87% higher value (measured by Tobin’s Q) than 
non-users. This study was done by investigating 720 large non-financial firms in 
US between 1990 and 1995. Bartram, Brown and Conrad (2011) found that users 
of financial derivatives had lower estimated values on both total and systematic 
risk. They also uncovered that lower systematic risk reduced the cost of debt. 
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2.2. Management theory and empirical evidence 
Principal-agent problem can be one explanation for firms’ hedging activity. The 
principal in this case is a shareholder in a firm and the agent is a manager of a 
firm. A manager will maximise his own utility at the expense of the firm value. 
This problem could arise when information asymmetry occurs and principals and 
agents have different interests (Holmstrom 1979). Managers often face a greater 
risk aversion compared to shareholders. That is because a greater part of their 
welfare is invested in the firm. A typical shareholder, however, holds a diversified 
portfolio and only fraction of his wealth is invested in any single public company. 
Shareholders will therefore be less risk-aversive compared to firm managers. As a 
consequence, profitable but risky projects may not always be realized. Managers 
will then have a concave utility function of a firm value (risk aversion) compared 
to a shareholder, who holds a diversified portfolio, will have a linear utility 
function of the firm value (risk natural).  Contract theory suggests that 
shareholders should structure a compensation contract that is convex in relation to 
the firm value. This will neutralise the effect of managers’ risk aversion. Convex 
contracts could include stock option and bonus plans (Hemmer, Kim and 
Verrecchia 1999).  
 
Smith and Stulz (1985) illustrate a hedging decision process for managers. 
Managers with a concave utility function of the firm value would only bear risk if 
he/she were rewarded by higher expected return. If there is no cost related to 
hedging and expected return is equal, the firm will completely hedge. A manager 
with a convex utility function of the firm value has a higher expected utility by not 
hedging at all. A manager will then behave as a risk-seeker. Risk-seeking 
behaviour could also be described by the Black and Scholes option-pricing model. 
The Black and Scholes option-pricing model describes that the value of an option 
increases when the underlying stock appreciates in value or when the volatility of 
the stock increases. A manager with a large proportion of stock options will then 
be willing to increase the volatility of the firm without increasing expected return 
(risk-seeking behaviour). 
    
Tufano (1996) shows graphically the value and utility of a stock and option 
position as a function of a firm’s stock price (please see the next page). Figure 1 
shows only the stock payoff and stock option payoff with an exercise price of 
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$100. Figure 2 shows the expected utility for risk-averse managers with a concave 
utility function of the firm value . If we assume a 
stock could take values of $50 or $150 with equal probability, the firm could also 
enter into hedging contract that locked in the stock price at $100. S(UH) and 
O(UH) stand for the expected utility of the unhedged stock and the option 
position. S(H) and O(H) stand for the expected  utility of the hedged stock and the 
option position. By comparing a situation where a manager holding a stock with a 
hedged position, S(H), and holding a stock in an unhedged position, S(UH), it is 
clear in the Figure 2 that the manager generates higher utility by holding a stock in 
a hedged position. In a situation where a manager holds a stock option, a hedged 
position, O(H), would make the stock option worthless, whereas an option in an 
unhedged position, O(UH), would have value. In that case a stockholder may then 
prefer to hedge, but an option holder may not. 
 
Figure 1 
This figure shows the value of a stock and the underlying call option with an exercise 
price of $ 100.   
 
Source: Tufano 1996.    
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Figure 2 
This figure shows the expected utility when the utility function is U = W
1/2
 (risk aversion). 
Suppose that, the stock is worth either $50 or $150, each with equal probability. The firm 
could also enter into a hedging contract that locks- in the stock price at $100.  The 
expected utility for holding an option in an unhedged position, O(UH), would be greater 
than holding an option in a hedged position, O(H). In a hedged position, the option will 
not pay off since the hedged position locks in the stock price at $100, the same as the 
exercise price. In an unhedged position, there is a 50% probability that the stock is worth 
$150; and since the exercise price is $100 the option will be worth $50. The expected 
utility for a stock in an unhedged position would be S(OH)  = ½ (50
1/2
 + 150
1/2
) and this 
is less than S(H) = 100
1/2
. Holding a stock creates an incentive to hedge, whereas holding 
an option creates an incentive to not hedge. 
 
Source: Tufano 1996.   
  
Firms often compensate manger with a long-term incentive plan or a 
compensation plan with stock option component. In a long-term incentive plan 
manager often get an immediate distribution of shares and they will get more 
shares if the manager stays with the company for a number of years. Bonus plans 
where payout depends on accounting earrings is also a common way for 
compensation. A bonus plan will only make a payment when the manager has 
exceeded a certain target. This compensation method has some similarities to a 
call option. The option only pays off when the share price is higher than the 
exercises price and the bonus plan only makes payments when the earnings 
exceed the target. This compensation plan will then face a convex utility function 
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of the firm value and managers would hedge less. Kim, Nam and Thornton (2008) 
argues that a typical bonus plan has a target but also a cap. The bonus plan will 
then have both a convex and a concave region. The convex region would be close 
to the target value while the concave region would be close to the cap. If the 
manager expects to easily to reach the bonus payoff cap, he or she will face a 
concave utility function. Managers who do not expect to reach the target will face 
a convex utility function. Managers who expect to reach the bonus payoff cap will 
then hedge more than managers that do not expect to reach the target.  
 
Tufano (1996) examined the gold mining industry in North America and found 
that managers who held more stock options did less in regards to risk management 
than managers that held more stocks. Rogers (2002), who studied the effect an 
executive portfolio structure has on risk management, also found evidence that 
managers with personal risk at stake did more to protect the firm. Kim, Nam and 
Thornton (2008) examined a bonus plan with a target and a cap, that resulting in a 
convex region and a concave region. He found that a manager who expected to be 
in the convex region had a negative relation on the usage of risk management 
derivatives. On the other hand, a manager who expected a concave region had a 
positive relation on the usage of risk management derivatives.  
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3. Hypotheses development 
Research regarding Norwegian firms’ usage of risk management tools is limited. 
However, Børsum and Ødegaard (2005) contribute with some interesting findings 
regarding the currency derivative usage among Norwegian firms. They discovered 
that larger firms use more financial derivatives than smaller firms. Also, they 
found that Norwegian firms act more and less in the same way as international 
firms in regards to the use of derivatives. However, Børsum and Ødegaard (2005) 
did not investigate the important role managerial behaviour could have on risk 
management decisions.  
 
The main research question for this master thesis is: Does management 
compensations affect the usage of financial derivatives among companies listed 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange. We develop three hypotheses that we test: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Management compensation based on stock options has a negative 
effect on the use of financial derivatives. 
 
Theory suggests that a manager with a convex compensation component in 
relation to the firm value would be more risk seeking and would hedge less. 
Tufano (1996) and Rogers (2002) found evidence for that. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Management performance-based compensation based on 
accounting earnings has an effect on the use of financial derivatives.  
 
A bonus based on accounting earnings often faces a cap. This bonus will both 
have a convex and a concave region in relation to the firm value. Kim, Nam and 
Thornton (2008) found evidence that managers who were expecting to be in the 
convex region were hedging less than managers who were expecting to be in the 
concave region.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Management compensation based on stocks has a positive effect on 
the use of financial derivatives. 
 
Master Thesis in GRA 19003  02.09.2013 
Page 11 
Managers who hold stocks in the firm have a utility function of the firm value that 
will be closer to the shareholders. Hence, they will hedge more. The results of 
Tufano (1996) and Rogers (2002) provide support for this claim. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
To answer our research question we decided to focus on non-financial firms 
trading on the Oslo Stock Exchange. We ended up examining 171 companies in 
total. Financial firms are not included because of their nature, where they often 
deal with financial instruments as their core business. Firms in financial distress 
are also not included because of inflated debt ratio. The data was collected from 
annual reports for the year 2011. Since all of the firms listed at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange have to follow international financial reporting standards (IFRS), they 
are required to report their usage of financial derivatives, discuss risk 
management, executive compensation and executive holding of shares and stock 
options. Hence, by studying annual reports we managed to collect the relevant 
data we needed.  
 
4.1. Dependent variables 
Since the main focus of this study is to observe how management compensation 
affects the financial derivative usage, we created a dependent variable called 
“users” of financial derivatives. By studying the annual reports we could decide 
whether firms used financial derivatives or not. The variable takes a value of 1 if a 
firm uses financial derivatives and 0 otherwise. 
 
Additionally, in order to test the robustness of our analysis we decided to 
implement a method used by Bartram, Brown and Condrad (2011). The idea of 
this method is to create a variable based on the intensity of the derivative usage. 
Firstly, the risk exposure is divided into three different groups; foreign exchange 
risk, interest rate risk and commodity price risk. Thereafter, the three groups are 
divided into three sub-groups; forward/futures, swaps and options, which are the 
most common types of financial derivatives (Bartram, Brown and Condrad 2011). 
By adding up the factors we got a score which we used to identify the extent of 
derivative usage. By doing so, we managed to create two new dependent 
variables, “hedging intensity 1” and “hedging intensity 2,” which we used to 
control for our main regression. The variable “hedging intensity 1” had a score 
range from 0 to 3, which was based on the three main groups of risk exposure. If a 
company, for example, used derivatives to hedge foreign exchange risk and 
interest rate risk, the score would be two. The variable “hedging intensity 2” had 
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scores range from 0 to 9. Here we also included the sub-groups. For example, if a 
company used forward/futures and options to hedge against foreign exchange risk, 
forwards/futures to hedge against commodity price risk and swaps to hedge 
against interest rate risk, the score would be four. 
 
4.2. Independent variables 
The data concerning management compensation was collected from annual 
reports. A bonus payment refers to when a CEO receives a bonus payment based 
on financial performance of the firm. Management compensation of shares is 
classified as if the CEO holds shares in the company or not. Management 
compensation of stock options is classified as if the CEO holds stock options in 
the company or not. All of the three variables are dummy variables which will 
take the value of “1” if the CEO receives/holds bonus payments, shares or stock 
options and “0” otherwise. 
 
In order to avoid omitted variable problems in the cross sectional regressions we 
had to include some control variables. Control variables should be variables that 
may have an impact on the usage of financial derivatives. Based on earlier 
research, we decided to include four different control variables, such as industry, 
firm size, capital structure and education. Data on firm size and capital structure 
was collected from DataStream whereas the rest of the data was collected from the 
annual reports.  
 
As Jin and Jorion (2006) point out, ﬁrms in certain industries might be more likely 
to hedge. The reason is based on the fact that the size of the risk exposure varies 
across industries and some risk exposures are easier to hedge than others. We used 
the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) in order to determine the 
industry. By removing the financial sector, we ended up with nine different 
sectors. All of the industry variables are dummy variables. 
 
Previous studies show that firm size has an explanatory effect on the usage of 
financial derivatives.  Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) lists up four arguments 
for why it is important to control for firm size. (1) Firms in financial distress could 
face legal cost with bankruptcy; this cost is relative decreasing to the firm size. 
This suggests that smaller firms should hedge more. (2) Smaller firms are more 
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likely to face progressive tax compared to larger firms. This also suggests that 
smaller firms should hedge more. (3) When the firm size increases, the number of 
people in the management often increases as well. Therefore, the knowledge about 
risk management can increase which could lead to higher hedging activity. (4) 
The derivative market transaction cost is facing a scale of economics structure; 
this implies that larger firms hedge more.  Since there are several reasons for why 
firm size matters, our expectations of the sign is ambiguous. Firm size is 
measured by book value of total assets. 
  
A firm with leverage pays interest on its debt, by doing that it pays less in tax than 
a firm with the same free cash flow. Since debt has a tax benefit, debt will 
increase the value of the firm. However, increase in firm debt increases the 
likelihood of financial distress. By using risk management derivatives, a firm can 
reduce the likelihood of financial distress by issuing more debt (Smith and Stulz 
1985). Capital structure is measured by the book value of debt ratio (book value of 
total leverage divided by book value of total asset). We expect that the sign of the 
capital structure variable is positive. 
 
Dionne, Chun and Triki (2012) are one of the first to actually examine the relation 
between risk management policy/activity and directors financial knowledge. They 
provide evidence regarding financially educated directors and its relation to 
hedging activity. Due to the fact that educational background of directors can 
affect risk management policy of a company, we decided to include a variable 
which captured educational background of a CEO. The variable is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of “1” if the CEO in the company has a background 
in finance and “0” otherwise. Based on the research by Dionne, Chun and Triki 
(2012), we should expect that CEOs with a finance background/education should 
have more knowledge about financial derivatives and risk exposures. Therefore, 
they should hedge more than CEOs with other educational backgrounds. 
Information about CEO educational background was collected from annual 
reports and Thomson Reuters.  
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4.3. Derivative usage 
In Table 1 a summary of the derivative usage is presented.  Out of the 171 firms in 
our sample, we found that 64% of the firms used derivatives. Overall, financial 
derivatives used to hedge against foreign exchange risk are most common (53%).  
Interest rate derivatives are the second most common (53%) and only 14% of the 
firms in the sample used commodity price derivatives. Among the foreign 
exchange derivative users 98% of them used forwards/futures, whereas swaps are 
the most frequently used derivatives among the interest rate derivative users 
(100%). As for commodity price derivative users, forward/future contracts are the 
most common derivative (76%). 
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Number of Users of % users of % Forward/Future % Swap % Option % users of % Forward/Future % Swap % Option % users of % Forward/Future % Swap % Option
firms derivatives FX derivatives of FX users of FX users of FX users IR derivatives of IR users of IR users of IR users Users of CP of CP users of CP users of CP users
Consumer discretionary 9 89 % 44 % 100 % 25 % 0 % 67 % 0 % 100 % 0 % 22 % 100 % 0 % 0 %
Consumer Staples 17 88 % 82 % 100 % 14 % 0 % 59 % 0 % 100 % 0 % 6 % 100 % 0 % 0 %
Energy 58 66 % 57 % 97 % 21 % 27 % 52 % 0 % 100 % 7 % 9 % 60 % 20 % 60 %
Health care 17 29 % 24 % 100 % 0 % 25 % 12 % 0 % 100 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Industry 33 85 % 70 % 96 % 17 % 22 % 58 % 5 % 100 % 11 % 24 % 63 % 25 % 38 %
Information Technology 22 27 % 27 % 100 % 17 % 17 % 9 % 0 % 100 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Materia ls 12 50 % 42 % 100 % 40 % 40 % 42 % 20 % 100 % 0 % 42 % 100 % 0 % 20 %
Telecommunication services 1 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 0 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Uti l i ties 2 100 % 100 % 100 % 50 % 50 % 100 % 0 % 100 % 0 % 100 % 100 % 0 % 100 %
Total 171 64 % 54 % 98 % 21 % 21 % 45 % 4 % 100 % 6 % 13 % 78 % 13 % 39 %
Industry
Foreign Exchange risk Interest rate risk Commodity price risk
Table 1 – Statistics of financial derivative usage 
Table 1 displays the total number of firms and the percentage users of financial derivatives in each of the industries. It also presents the percentage number of firms 
that use financial derivatives to hedge for foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk and commodity price risk. The percentage number of forward/futures, swap and 
option are calculated based on the users of foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity price derivatives.   
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4.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents an overview of the descriptive statistics for the entire sample, 
whereas Table 3 reveals the characteristics for firms using financial derivatives 
and for firms that do not use them at all.  
 
Comparing the mean of the debt ratio we can see that the firms which use 
financial derivatives have a higher on average debt ratio (58.8% compared to 
37.8%). According to our difference of means test, the mean for users and non-
users are also statistically significant (see Appendix 1). This is consistent with our 
expectations and the theory provided earlier in our thesis. Also, the total assets are 
higher for the firms using financial derivatives compared to the firms that do not 
use financial derivatives.  
 
The variables concerning management compensation for users and non-users of 
financial derivatives reveal some interesting findings. As for the share and stock 
option variables the pattern is clear. It seems like users of financial derivatives 
hold more shares (83.5% compared to 64.5%) and fewer stock options (46.8% 
compared to 72.6%) than non-users of financial derivatives. According to our 
difference of means test, this is also statistically significant (see appendix 1). 
However, for the bonus payment variable there are no extraordinary differences 
between users and non-users of financial derivatives. When comparing our 
education and the industry variables for users and non-users, there are also no 
clear patterns. 
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 Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std. Dev.  Sum  Obs  Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std, Dev,  Sum Obs
Users 1 1 1 1 -          109 109 0 0 0 0 0 0 62
Hedging intensity 1 1,761 2 3 1 0,693      192 109 0 0 0 0 0 0 62
Hedging intensity 2 2,229 2 7 1 1,425      243 109 0 0 0 0 0 0 62
Bonus payment 0,771 1 1 0 0,422      84 109 0,726 1 1 0 0,450      45 62
Shares 0,835 1 1 0 0,373      91 109 0,645 1 1 0 0,482      40 62
Stock option 0,468 0 1 0 0,501      51 109 0,726 1 1 0 0,450      45 62
Education Finance 0,440 0 1 0 0,499      48 109 0,371 0 1 0 0,487      23 62
Debt ratio 0,588 0,604    0,951     0,166 0,151      64,073      109 0,378 0,380    0,776 0,008 0,227      23,409 62
Total assets 19,480 4,782    762,903 0,042 75,838    2 123,292 109 0,865 0,396    8,766 0,012 1,511      53,656 62
Consumer discretionary 0,073 0 1 0 0,262      8 109 0,016 0 1 0 0,127      1 62
Consumer Staples 0,138 0 1 0 0,346      15 109 0,032 0 1 0 0,178      2 62
Energy 0,349 0 1 0 0,479      38 109 0,323 0 1 0 0,471      20 62
Health care 0,046 0 1 0 0,210      5 109 0,194 0 1 0 0,398      12 62
Industry 0,257 0 1 0 0,439      28 109 0,081 0 1 0 0,275      5 62
Information Technology 0,055 0 1 0 0,229      6 109 0,258 0 1 0 0,441      16 62
Materials 0,055 0 1 0 0,229      6 109 0,097 0 1 0 0,298      6 62
Telecommunication services 0,009 0 1 0 0,096      1 109
Utilities 0,018 0 1 0 0,135      2 109
Users Non-users
Industry
Financial information
Compensation
Derivative usage
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics – Overall 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the entire sample size. Total assets are 
measured in billions (NOK). 
 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics – Users vs. Non-users 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for derivative users and non-users. Total assets 
are measured in billions (NOK).  
 
 
 Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std. Dev.  Sum Obs
Users 0,637 1 1 0 0,482 109 171
Hedging intensity 1 1,123 1 3 0 1,013 192 171
Hedging intensity 2 1,421 1 7 0 1,564 243 171
Bonus payment 0,754 1 1 0 0,432 129 171
Shares 0,766 1 1 0 0,425 131 171
Stock option 0,561 1 1 0 0,498 96 171
Education Finance 0,415 0 1 0 0,494 71 171
Debt ratio 0,512 0,560 0,951 0,008 0,208 87,482 171
Total assets 12,731 1,943    762,903 0,012 61,116     2 176,948 171
Consumer discretionary 0,053 0 1 0 0,224 9 171
Consumer Staples 0,099 0 1 0 0,300 17 171
Energy 0,339 0 1 0 0,475 58 171
Health care 0,099 0 1 0 0,300 17 171
Industry 0,193 0 1 0 0,396 33 171
Information Technology 0,129 0 1 0 0,336 22 171
Materials 0,070 0 1 0 0,256 12 171
Telecommunication services 0,006 0 1 0 0,076 1 171
Utilities 0,012 0 1 0 0,108 2 171
Derivative usage
Compensation
Industry
Financial information
Users and non-users
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4.5. Correlation matrix 
In order to compare the correlations between the dependent and explanatory 
variables, we used the Spearman correlation matrix. From the correlation matrix, 
we discovered that holding shares had a significantly positive correlation on the 
use of financial derivatives and stock options had a significant negative 
correlation on use of financial derivatives. This is in line with theory and our 
hypothesis. There was no significant correlation between bonus payment and 
users of derivatives. Financial information such as debt ratio and total asset, are 
significantly positive correlated, whereas five out of nine industry variables were 
correlated to derivative usage (see Appendix 2). 
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5. Empirical results 
The analysis is presented in a multivariate framework. A multivariate regression 
takes into consideration the relation between variables. The correlation matrix 
suggests, for example, that firm size is significantly correlated with both 
“derivative usage” and “bonus payment.” By running a multivariate regression we 
can adjust for the effect firm size has on bonus payment. Therefore, in order to 
test our hypotheses, we ran seven different regressions. In the first regression we 
only included the compensation variables. Thereafter, we included all of the 
control variables, which had an effect on the compensation coefficients. In the 
next two regressions we subtracted some of the control variables in order to look 
at the effect they had on the compensation coefficients. In the end, we ran three 
different regressions, which included one of the compensation variables at a time. 
Since the dependent variable, user, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
a firm report usage of financial derivatives and 0 otherwise, we tested our 
equations in a binary logistic regression. Interpretation of coefficient values in a 
binary logistic regression is difficult. That is because they cannot be interpreted as 
the marginal effect. Nevertheless, it can tell us the sign of the effect of the 
variable. Since the coefficients are difficult to interpret, we calculated the 
marginal effect. The marginal effect is the partial derivative with respect to the 
variable. It provides an estimation of the change in probability of the dependent 
variable to a change in the independent variable.  In Panel A we present the results 
from our two first regressions.  
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Bonus payment 0,0882 0.364 0.3771 0.356 0.1051 0.453 0.5705 0.424
Shares 0,2476*** 0.008 1.0390*** 0.008 0.1401 0.300 0.7423 0.268
Stock option -0.2716*** 0.000 -1.2461*** 0.001 -0.2119** 0.035 -1.3019** 0.040
EduFinance 0.0252 0.794 0.1485 0.795
log Debt ratio 0.2046** 0.050 1.1976** 0.027
log Total Assets 0.2637*** 0.000 1.5434*** 0.000
Consumer Staples 0.1574 0.156 1.248 0.311
Consumer discretionary 0.2333*** 0.001 3.0849 0.206
Energy -0.0275 0.872 -0.1589 0.871
Health care 0.2458*** 0.001 2.7269** 0.039
Industry 0.2529*** 0.004 2.1642** 0.034
Information Technology 0.0320 0.869 0.195 0.875
Materials 0.1335 0.280 1.0212 0.425
Constant 0.2352 0.586
Panel A - 2
Panel A: Dependent variable: Users
Independent        
Variables
Wald chi2(13) = 43.05
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Number of obs. = 168
Log likelihood = -43.655205
Marginal    
Effect
Coefficients
P-value 
Coeff.
P-value 
M.E.
Pseudo R2 = 0.0880
Panel A - 1
Number of obs. = 168
Log likelihood = -100.88125
LR chi2(3) = 19.48
Prob > chi2 = 0.0002
Marginal    
Effect
P-value 
M.E.
Coefficients
P-value 
Coeff.
Panel A – Binary logistics regressions 
Panel A presents results from two binary logistics regressions. The dependent variable is 
users, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm used financial 
derivatives and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are Bonus payment, Shares and 
Stock option, which are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if a CEO receives bonus 
payments, shares or stock options and 0 otherwise; EduFinance, which is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO has a financial education background and 0 
otherwise; log Debt ratio and log Total Assets, which are natural logarithms of the debt 
ratio and the total assets. The last variables are all dummy variables that take the value 
of 1depending on the industry the firm is in and 0 otherwise. Totally there were nine 
industry variables, but we had to exclude the two last industry variables, 
Telecommunication services and Utilities, because of the low number of observations. ** 
or *** mean that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% or 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
The focus of our research was to test whether CEO compensations affected the 
financial derivative usage. The results in Panel A indicate that compensation 
based on bonus payment was not statistically significant but had a positive sign. 
As specified in our hypotheses, we were unsure about which effect the variable 
could have (positive or negative), since theory points in both directions.  Since 
there is a positive sign, it indicates that many CEOs were facing a cap on their 
bonuses. The variable “Shares” (CEOs holding shares in a firm) had a positive 
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coefficient as expected from theory. In Panel A – 1, where we did not include the 
control variables, “Shares” was statistically significant and positive. However, in 
Panel A – 2, when we included the control variables, the variable was not 
statistically significant. Hence, we saw the effect control variables had on our 
compensation variable, “Shares”. As for CEO holdings of stock options we find 
evidence for a significant negative marginal effect related to usage of financial 
derivatives. A marginal effect with a coefficient -0,2119 (Panel A – 2) means that 
the likelihood for usage of financial derivatives decreases with 21,19% if a CEO 
goes from not holding stock option to holding stock options. This is consistent 
with previous theory and research (Tufano 1996).  Our variable for whether the 
CEOs education background affected the usage of financial derivatives 
(EduFinance) was not statistically significant. Hence, we could not determine that 
a CEO with a finance education tends to use more financial derivatives than other 
CEOs. 
 
The capital structure, measured as the logarithm of the debt ratio, is statistically 
significant and positive. This is consistent with previous theory, which states that 
an increase in the firms’ debt ratio should positively affect the derivative usage 
(Smith and Stulz 1985). The theory regarding firm size and its relation to risk 
management was somewhat unclear. However, in our research we find that firm 
size, measured as the logarithm of total assets, has a positive effect on the usage of 
financial derivatives (statistically significant). This indicates that larger firms have 
a higher probability of using financial derivatives than smaller firms. As for the 
industry variables, we found that two of the variables (Health care and Industry) 
were positively statistically significant with usage of financial derivatives. Hence, 
this shows that it is important to control for industry.  
 
Panel B reveals the results from two other logistic regressions. In the first 
regression (Panel B - 1) we excluded the firm size variable and the education 
variable. As the results indicated, both bonus payment and stock option were 
statistically significant. Also the debt ratio variable and five of the industry 
variables were statistically significant. In the second regression (Panel B - 2) we 
also excluded the debt ratio variable, leaving only the compensation variables and 
industry variables. Although the regression did not control for firm size and the 
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Bonus payment 0.3430*** 0.005 1.4696*** 0.007 0.2151* 0.059 0.9300* 0.055
Shares 0.0670 0.570 0.2958 0.562 0.2567** 0.013 1.1025** 0.012
Stock option -0.2444*** 0.008 -1.1533** 0.013 -0.2385*** 0.003 -1.1370*** 0.006
EduFinance
log Debt ratio 0.4285*** 0.000 1.9367*** 0.000
log Total Assets
Consumer Staples 0.3437*** 0.000 2.5723*** 0.010 0.2019* 0.090 1.1335 0.211
Consumer discretionary 0.3292*** 0.000 2.7647** 0.046 0.1747 0.283 0.9705 0.415
Energy 0.3181*** 0.007 1.6238** 0.022 -0.0347 0.775 -0.1572 0.772
Health care 0.1337 0.424 0.6749 0.486 -0.3940** 0.020 -1.6682** 0.033
Industry 0.3981*** 0.000 2.6482*** 0.001 0.1964** 0.039 1.0297* 0.099
Information Technology -0.0810 0.700 -0.3524 0.691 -0.4795*** 0.001 -2.0899*** 0.006
Materials 0.2834*** 0.001 1.902** 0.047 -0.0948 0.597 -0.4109 0.580
Panel B: Dependent variable: Users
Panel B - 1 Panel B - 2
Independent        
Variables
Marginal    
Effect
P-value 
M.E.
Coefficients
P-value 
Coeff.
Marginal    
Effect
P-value 
M.E.
Coefficients
P-value 
Coeff.
Number of obs. = 168 Wald chi2(11) = 47.92 Number of obs. = 168 Wald chi2(10) = 41.60
Log likelihood = -70.817337 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Log likelihood = -83.64307 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
firms’ capital structure, the results indicated that all of the compensation variables 
were statistically significant.  
 
Panel B - Binary logistics regressions 
Panel B presents results from two binary logistics regressions. The dependent variable is users, 
which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm used financial derivatives and 0 
otherwise. The independent variables are Bonus payment, Shares and Stock option, which are 
dummy variables that take the value of 1 if a CEO receives bonus payments, shares or stock 
options and 0 otherwise; log Debt ratio, which are the natural logarithms of the debt ratio. The 
last variables are all dummy variables that take the value of 1depending on the industry the firm is 
in and 0 otherwise. Totally there were nine industry variable, but we had to exclude the two last 
industry variables, Telecommunication services and Utilities, because of the low number of 
observations. ** or *** mean that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% or 1% levels, 
respectively. 
    
Panel C reveals the results from the regressions, which we used to analyze the 
compensation variables separately. As for the two first regressions (Panel C – 1 
and 2), neither the “Bonus payment” nor the “Shares” variable were statistically 
significant. However, the sign of the coefficients was equal to what we discovered 
in both Panel A and B. In the last regression (Panel C – 3) we once again saw that 
“Stock option” was statistically significant and negative.  
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Panel C - Binary logistics regressions 
Panel C presents results from two binary logistics regressions. The dependent variable is users, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm used financial 
derivatives and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are Bonus payment, Shares and Stock option, which are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if a CEO receives bonus 
payments, shares or stock options and 0 otherwise; log Debt ratio, which are natural logarithms of the debt ratio. The last variables are all dummy variables that take the value of 
1depending on the industry the firm is in and 0 otherwise. Totally there were nine industry variable, but we had to exclude the two last industry variables, Telecommunication 
services and Utilities, because of the low number of observations. ** or *** mean that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% or 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Bonus payment 0.0394 0.744 0.2153 0.737
Shares 0.1344 0.317 0.7040 0.287
Stock option -0.1859* 0.057 -1.0959* 0.061
EduFinance 0.0117 0.905 0.0660 0.905 0.0069 0.942 0.0398 0.942 0.0137 0.890 0.0775 0.890
log Debt ratio 0.2535** 0.019 1.4248*** 0.008 0.2275** 0.033 1.3069** 0.016 0.2200** 0.034 1.2442** 0.017
log Total Assets 0.2667*** 0.000 1.4987*** 0.000 0.2736*** 0.000 1.572*** 0.000 0.2717*** 0.000 1.5369*** 0.000
Consumer Staples 0.2106*** 0.006 1.8213* 0.085 0.1622 0.126 1.2616 0.279 0.2308*** 0.001 2.1864** 0.041
Consumer discretionary 0.2526*** 0.000 3.3526 0.106 0.2367*** 0.000 2.9898 0.150 0.2620*** 0.000 3.9539 0.129
Energy 0.0314 0.813 0.1771 0.816 -0.0637 0.698 -0.3556 0.691 0.1286 0.242 0.7783 0.276
Health care 0.2590*** 0.000 2.7286** 0.034 0.2382*** 0.001 2.4226** 0.045 0.2907*** 0.000 3.6738*** 0.002
Industry 0.2919*** 0.000 2.5117*** 0.003 0.2456*** 0.005 2.0054** 0.041 0.3197*** 0.000 2.9465*** 0.001
Information Technology 0.0821 0.598 0.5137 0.644 0.0181 0.921 0.1064 0.923 0.1700* 0.071 1.2671 0.209
Materials 0.0981 0.493 0.6475 0.568 0.0548 0.752 0.3429 0.773 0.1775* 0.065 1.4654 0.229
Independent        
Variables
Marginal    
Effect
P-value 
M.E.
Coefficients
P-value 
Coeff.
Number of obs. = 168 Wald chi2(11) = 43.29 Number of obs. = 168 Wald chi2(10) = 42.32
Panel C - 1 Panel C - 2
Marginal    
Effect
P-value 
M.E.
Wald chi2(10) = 44.56
Log likelihood = -44.6812 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Panel C: Dependent variable: Users
Log likelihood = -46.422399 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Log likelihood = -45.906985 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Panel C - 3
Marginal    
Effect
P-value 
M.E.
Coefficients
P-value 
Coeff.
Number of obs. = 168
Coefficients
P-value 
Coeff.
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The main finding from our regressions above is that CEOs holding stock options 
in a firm negatively affects the usage of financial derivatives. In all of the 
regressions we discovered that the “Stock option” variable was statistically 
significant and negative. This is robust evidence, which is consistent with 
previous theory and research (Tufano 1996; Rogers 2002). Although, we find 
significant coefficients for the “Bonus Payment” and “Shares” variables in some 
of the regressions, this is still not robust.  
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6. Robustness test 
In order to test the robustness of our findings we implemented the method used by 
Bartram, Brown and Condrad (2011). By doing so, we managed to create two new 
dependent variables, “Hedging intensity 1” and “Hedging intensity 2”, which took 
into account the hedging intensity of a firm. Since the variable “Hedging intensity 
1” could take the values from 0 to 3 and the variable “Hedging intensity 2” could 
take the values from 0 to 9, we used an ordered logistics regression. The results 
from the regressions are shown in panels D and E.  
 
In Panel D the dependent variable was “hedging intensity 1”. The first regression 
(Panel D – 1) only included our compensation variables. As we can see from the 
results both the variable “Shares” and “Stock option” were statistically significant 
and the sign of the coefficients were consistent with our main regression (Panel 
A). However, when we included all of the control variables in the regression 
(Panel D – 2), the compensation variables were not statistically significant. This 
again reveals that some of the control variables affect the usage of financial 
derivatives.  
 
In Panel E we used “hedging intensity 2” as the dependent variable. As from the 
results, we observed that when we included the control variables (Panel E – 2) the 
compensation variable “Stock option” was statistically significant and negative. 
Overall, the results from Panel E are consistent with those presented previously. 
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Bonus payment 0.2782 0.426 0.0533 0.906
Shares 0.9465*** 0.008 0.5215 0.275
Stock option -0.7588** 0.011 -0.5876 0.126
EduFinance 0.3771 0.306
log Debt ratio 1.4606*** 0.003
log Total Assets 1.5105*** 0.000
Consumer Staples -1.3460 0.152
Consumer discretionary -1.9766* 0.069
Energy -2.0769** 0.017
Health care 0.0637 0.954
Industry -0.3989 0.659
Information Technology -2.4240** 0.020
Materials (omitted) 0
Cut 1 -0.0466 -2.5102
Cut 2 1.0604 0.0655
Cut 3 3.0361 3.7636
Number of obs. = 168 LR chi2(3) = 15.19 Number of obs. = 168 LR chi2(12) = 192.45
Log likelihood = -207.8202 Prob > chi2 = 0.017 Log likelihood = -119.1876 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.0353 Pseudo R2 = 0.4467
Panel D: Dependent variable: Hedging intensity 1
Limit points
Independent Variables Coefficients P - value
Panel D - 1
Coefficients P - value
Panel D - 2
 Panel D – Ordered logistics regressions 
Panel D presents results from two ordered logistics regressions (Panel D – 1 and Panel 
D – 2). The dependent variable is hedging intensity 1, which is a variable that can take 
the values from 0 to 3 and captures the hedging intensity of a firm. The independent 
variables are Bonus payment, Shares and Stock option, which are dummy variables that 
take the value of 1 if a CEO receives bonus payments, shares or stock options and 0 
otherwise; EduFinance, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO 
has a financial education background and 0 otherwise; log Debt ratio and log Total 
Assets, which are natural logarithms of the debt ratio and the total assets. The last 
variables are all dummy variables that take the value of 1depending on the industry the 
firm is in and 0 otherwise. Totally there were nine industry variable, but we had to 
exclude the two last industry variables, Telecommunication services and Utilities, 
because of the low number of observations. ** or *** mean that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 5% or 1% levels, respectively. 
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Bonus payment 0.3012 0.383 -0.1990 0.646
Shares 0.9278*** 0.009 0.5650 0.225
Stock option -0.7982*** 0.007 -0.7855** 0.027
EduFinance 0.4687 0.179
log Debt ratio 1.3358*** 0.004
log Total Assets 1.5355*** 0.000
Consumer Staples -0.9944 0.230
Consumer discretionary -1.4900 0.127
Energy -1.2453* 0.097
Health care 0.9220 0.370
Industry -0.1179 0.882
Information Technology -1.5283 0.106
Materials (omitted) 0
Cut 1 -0.0665 -2.0021
Cut 2 1.0189 0.5237
Cut 3 2.0442 2.5186
Cut 4 3.2637 4.5055
Cut 5 3.9067 5.4832
Cut 6 5.0400 7.4111
Number of obs. = 168 LR chi2(3) = 15.19 Number of obs. = 168 LR chi2(12) = 199.16
Log likelihood = -207.8202 Prob > chi2 = 0.017 Log likelihood = -158.8071 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.0353 Pseudo R2 = 0.3854
Limit points
Panel E: Dependent variable: Hedging intensity 2
Panel E - 1 Panel E - 2
Independent Variables Coefficients P - value Coefficients P - value
Panel E - Ordered logistics regressions 
Panel E presents results from two ordered logistics regressions (Panel E – 1 and Panel E 
– 2). The dependent variable is hedging intensity 2, which is a variable that can take the 
values from 0 to 9 and captures the hedging intensity of a firm. The independent variables 
are Bonus payment, Shares and Stock option, which are dummy variables that take the 
value of 1 if a CEO receives bonus payments, shares or stock options and 0 otherwise; 
EduFinance, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO has a 
financial education background and 0 otherwise; log Debt ratio and log Total Assets, 
which are natural logarithms of the debt ratio and the total assets. The last variables are 
all dummy variables that take the value of 1depending on the industry the firm is in and 0 
otherwise. Totally there were nine industry variable, but we had to exclude the two last 
industry variables, Telecommunication services and Utilities, because of the low number 
of observations. ** or *** mean that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% 
or 1% levels, respectively. 
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7. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to examine whether management compensation affects 
the usage of financial derivatives. The data was collected manually from annual 
reports of 171 non-financial firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange in 2011. In 
order to capture the effects management compensation had on the usage of 
financial derivatives we ran a multivariate regression. In our main regression, 
where the dependent variable was users or non-users of financial derivatives, we 
used a binary logistics regression. As for the robustness test, where the dependent 
variables captured the hedging intensity, we run an ordered logistics regression.  
 
Our research provides evidence that CEOs holding stock options have a 
statistically significant negative effect on the usage of financial derivatives. In all 
the regression specifications we ran, the stock options dummy was highly 
significant. Thus our results confirm those of Tufano (1996) and Rogers (2002) on 
a different sample and in a different time period. This suggests that the risk 
management incentives’ stemming from stock options is a strong and quite robust 
one.  
 
Although, the results concerning derivative usage and CEOs who hold shares in 
the company was not robust, we observed a positive link between them. As for 
bonus payment we observed a positive relation between the variable and the usage 
of financial derivatives. However, the result was not robust. One potential reason 
we did not find any robust results concerning the effect bonus payment and shares 
could have on financial derivative usage, could be that we were not able to collect 
data on the size of management compensation from firms’ annual reports. As for 
bonus payment, we did not take into consideration that some firms have a limit on 
how much bonus a CEO can receive, which again can affect the hedging decision.   
 
We also found it interesting to control for the education background of the CEO. 
Our expectations were that CEOs with a financial education should have more 
knowledge about risk management and therefore use more financial derivatives. 
Although we observed a positive relation, our result was not significant. 
Furthermore, our research suggests that also other firm characteristics, such as 
firm size and capital structure, affect the hedging activity. An increase in the 
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firms’ debt ratio increased the probability of hedging. Our results also suggest that 
firm size affects the derivative usage. We observed a significant positive relation 
between firm size and the usage of financial derivatives.  
 
With regards to further research -- though the data collection is time consuming -- 
it may be useful to look at whether the usage of financial derivatives varies across 
time as our analysis is based on one year’s worth of data. Historical data may 
provide more clarity on the usage of financial derivatives across different time 
periods, good and bad years, booms and recessions.  
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9. Appendix 
Appendix 1 – Difference of Means 
The table presents the difference of Means t-Test (Two-Sample assuming unequal 
variance). The test compares the mean for the variables; bonus payment, shares, stock 
option, education finance and debt ratio for users and non-users of financial derivatives. 
*** mean that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
Users Non-users Users Non-users Users Non-users Users Non-users Users Non-users
Mean 0,771 0,726 0,835 0,645 0,468 0,726 0,440 0,371 0,588 0,378
Variance 0,178 0,202 0,139 0,233 0,251 0,202 0,249 0,237 0,023 0,052
Observations 109 62 109 62 109 62 109 62 109 62
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0 0 0
df 120 103 139 129 92
t-Stat 0,641 2,675 -3,457 0,888 6,511
P-value 0,523 0,009 *** 0,001 *** 0,376 0,000 ***
Debt ratioBonus Payment Shares Stock option Education Finance
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Education
Users Hedging int. 1 Hedging int. 2 Bonus payment Shares Stock option Finance Debt ratio Total Assets Consumer d. Consumer S. Energy Health care Industry Info. Tech. Materials Tele. Serv. Utilities
Users 1
Hedging intensity 1 0,873*** 1
Hedging intensity 2 0,864*** 0,981*** 1
Bonus payment 0,05 0,069 0,074 1
Shares 0,215*** 0,232*** 0,228*** 0,166** 1
Stock option -0,25*** -0,198*** -0,204*** 0,208*** 0,013 1
Education Finance 0,068 0,102 0,117 0,067 0,045 0,099 1
Debt ratio 0,437*** 0,453*** 0,432*** -0,157** 0,254*** -0,184** 0,14* 1
Total assets 0,683*** 0,78*** 0,79*** 0,166** 0,153** -0,081 0,068 0,319*** 1
Consumer discretionary 0,123 0,055 0,048 0,074 0,068 -0,056 0,12 0,089 0,081 1
Consumer Staples 0,169** 0,127* 0,101 0,053 0,045 0,018 0,037 0,01 0,134* -0,078 1
Energy 0,026 0,048 0,077 0,007 -0,071 -0,039 -0,102 0,05 0,258*** -0,169** -0,238*** 1
Health care -0,237*** -0,257*** -0,248*** 0,053 -0,047 0,136* 0,037 -0,23*** -0,382*** -0,078 -0,11 -0,238*** 1
Industry 0,215*** 0,19** 0,165** -0,237*** 0,06 -0,135* -0,081 0,242*** 0,038 -0,115 -0,162** -0,35*** -0,162** 1
Information Technology -0,292*** -0,294*** -0,285*** 0,138* 0,089 0,093 0,066 -0,131* -0,298*** -0,091 -0,128* -0,275*** -0,128* -0,188** 1
Materials -0,079 0,012 -0,006 -0,056 -0,173** 0,058 0,001 -0,123 -0,016 -0,065 -0,091 -0,197** -0,091 -0,134* -0,106 1
Telecommunication services 0,058 0,072 0,126 0,044 0,042 0,068 0,091 -0,039 0,131* -0,018 -0,025 -0,055 -0,025 -0,038 -0,029 -0,021 1
Utilities 0,082 0,179** 0,178** 0,062 0,06 -0,123 0,019 0,046 0,119 -0,026 -0,036 -0,078 -0,036 -0,053 -0,042 -0,03 -0,008 1
*,** or *** mean that the correlation is significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels, respectively (2-tailed)
Financial 
information
Industry
Derivative usage Compensation Financial information Industry
Derivative 
usage
Compensation
Appendix 2 – Correlation Matrix 
The table presents the Spearman correlation matrix between our dependent variables (Users, Hedging intensity 1 and Hedging intensity 2) and our 
independent variables. 
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Introduction 
Managing risk is an important topic in finance. It has been increasingly common 
among companies to reduce their risk exposure in order to have more stable cash-
flows. Depending on their attitudes toward risk, firms often use financial 
derivatives as a risk management instrument. The reasons for using risk 
management instruments are based on economies of scale arguments, financial 
distress, ownership structure and liquidity issues. Firms often face risk associated 
with foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity prices. The most common 
derivatives firms use to reduce these types of exposure are forwards/futures, 
options and swaps.  
 
Stulz (2003) explains that managerial compensation contract, which may include 
stock options, ownership stocks and cash bonuses, could be one reason why 
companies may or may not use risk management instruments. Shareholders are 
interested in maximizing the value of their firm’s shares. By relating managerial 
compensation to some measure of value, managers’ financial wellbeing will 
depend on how the company is doing and thus affect their attitude toward the 
usage of risk management instruments.  
 
Given the fact that risk management is important for so many firms, this master 
thesis will examine how executive compensation affects the usage of financial 
derivatives among companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. To answer our 
main research problem we have created three different hypotheses which we will 
test. Firstly, we look at whether stock options have a negative impact on the usage 
of financial instruments. Secondly, we consider whether cash bonuses have a 
negative impact on the usage of financial derivatives. Thirdly, we look at whether 
management compensation based on stocks has a positive effect on the usage of 
financial derivatives. Our hypotheses are mainly based on the theory which Smith 
and Stulz (1985) present, which states that managerial compensations is important 
in the use of risk management instruments. In addition, we will ponder whether 
education level of a CEO affects the use of financial derivatives. To test these 
hypotheses we will gather relevant information from annual reports.  
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In this preliminary report, we first consider the theory regarding different 
compensation schemes and existing research on the usage of financial derivatives. 
Then we present the research methodology and discuss practical implications of 
this master thesis.  
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Theory 
Classical finance theories suggest that risk management does not create value. 
According to the Modigliani and Miller paradigm (1958), risk management is 
irrelevant to the firm because shareholders can do it on their own. However, this 
assumes that the capital market is perfect and there is no difference between the 
cost of risk management within the firm and outside the firm. For risk 
management to increase the firm’s value, it must be more expensive for the firm 
to take on risk rather than hedge (Stulz 2003). 
 
Stulz (2003) discusses main reasons why risk management is important for firms.  
Firstly, firms with higher debt-ratio and in financial distress have a higher 
probability of not having enough cash flow to pay the debt. This will again 
increase the probability of bankruptcy. One common way to reduce the 
probability of bankruptcy is for firms to use risk management instruments.  
Secondly, risk management also has an impact on tax payments. By not using risk 
management instruments, the probability of paying higher taxes increases. 
Thirdly, the usage of management instruments allows companies to increase their 
debt level. This will again affect their tax-shield, which will increase. Finally, 
investors who have a large portion of the company’s shares would like the 
company to reduce their exposure towards risk.  
 
The theories concerning corporate managers’ risk aversion can also explain the 
usage of financial instrument for hedging purposes. Executives in the company 
want to maximize their own utility/welfare. Executive compensation will then 
have an impact on their risk aversion. Smith and Stulz (1985) model predicts that 
managers with greater stock ownership would prefer more risk management. On 
the other hand, a manager with stock options prefers less risk management. That is 
because stocks provide linear payoffs as function of the stock price, stock option 
provide convex payoffs as function of the stock price.  
 
Tufano (1996) shows graphically the value and the utility of stock and option 
position, as a function of the firm’s stock price (please see the next page). The 
first panel shows only the stock payoff and stock option payoff with exercise price 
of $100. The second panel shows the expected utility for risk-averse managers 
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. If we assume the stock could take the values $50 or $150 with equal 
probability, the firm could also enter into hedging contract that locked-in the stock 
price at $100. S(UH) and O(UH) stand for the expected utility of the of the 
unhedged stock and option position. S(H) and O(H) stand for the expected  utility 
of the of the hedged stock and option position. The stock holder may prefer to 
hedge, but the option holder may not. 
 
 
Source: Tufano 1996.  Figure 1 
 
 
Source: Tufano 1996.  Figure 2 
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Research problem and motivation 
 
Research problem 
The main research question for this master thesis is: How does executive 
compensation affect the usage of financial derivatives among companies listed on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
 
We will answer our research question by mainly looking at how management 
remuneration affects the use of derivatives among companies listed on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange. In addition, we will also consider other factors relevant to the 
derivatives’ use. Overall, we propose four hypotheses which we plan to test: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Management compensation based on stock options has a negative 
effect on the use of financial derivatives. 
 
The Black and Scholes option pricing model (1973) suggests that higher volatility 
creates higher value for the option. By using financial derivatives for hedging, the 
cash-flow will be less volatile and then the option will have less value. In that case 
executives have less incentive to hedge (Smith and Stulz 1985). 
  
Hypothesis 2: Management performance-based compensation based on cash 
bonus has a negative effect on the use of financial derivatives. 
 
Cash bonuses based on the firm financial statements work really similar to call 
options. Bonuses will only be paid if the executive manager achieves a number of 
goals. This is similar to a call option where one gets paid when the stock against 
which the call option is written achieves higher value than the strike price (Stulz 
2003). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Management compensation based on stocks has a positive effect on 
the use of financial derivatives. 
 
Ownership of shares in the firm ties executives’ welfare more closely to 
shareholders’ welfare. Executives will then more likely maximize firm value. 
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Since hedging creates value, the usage of financial derivatives is likely to increase 
(Stulz 2003). An undiversified financial position for risk-averse executives could 
also result in increased hedging. (Smith and Stulz 1985) 
 
Hypothesis 4: Education of a CEO affects the use of financial derivatives. 
 
Knowledge/education level of the CEO can explain why some firms use more 
financial derivatives than others.  
 
Brief literature review 
According to Stulz (2003), derivatives markets can be traced back to the 17th 
century, when Holland had its own market for tulip options and Japan had a 
futures market for rice. However, it was not until late in the 20th century that the 
derivatives markets really took off. Today derivatives markets are widely known 
and companies use derivatives to reduce their exposure to risk. 
 
Research on the use of risk management by firms has been done for many years, 
and we can divide the evidence into two different types. The first type is evidence 
based on surveys and the second type is evidence based on analysis of firm-
specific data. Regardless of the types, research indicates that companies that use 
derivatives have higher value and lower cash-flow volatility (Stulz 2003, 630). 
 
Dolde (1993) created a questionnaire, which he sent out to all Fortune 500 firms. 
Out of all companies which responded (244 companies in total), approximately 
85% used some sort of derivatives to manage financial risks. Also, larger firms 
had a significantly higher probability of using derivatives. However, smaller firms 
that used derivatives usually hedged a greater portion of their exposures. Other 
well-known surveys on financial risk management are the Wharton studies done 
by Bodnar et al. in 1995 and 1998. The studies look at the usage of derivatives 
among non-financial firms in the US. The findings support the research done by 
Dolde in 1993, where the use of derivatives is more common for larger firms. 
However, only 13% of the firms with a market value below 50 million USD used 
them.   
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Since the requirements regarding reporting standard for firms have increased, it is 
now possible to read about the use of derivatives in the annual reports published 
by firms. Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) used this method to study publicly 
traded Fortune 500 firms. Their results indicated that 56% of companies in their 
sample used some sort of derivatives.  
 
Stulz (2003) argues that ownership variables affect the extent of hedging. This 
argument is supported by studies done by Tufano (1996) and Rogers (2002). 
Tufano (1996) examined the gold mining industry in North America and found 
that managers that held more stock options did less in regards to risk management 
than managers that held more stocks rather than options. Rogers (2002) who 
studied the affect executive portfolio structure had on risk management, also 
found evidence which is consistent with these results. 
 
Research on risk management is more common in foreign countries than in 
Norway. However, Børsum and Ødegaard (2005) summarize a questionnaire 
conducted by the Norwegian Central Bank in 2004. The questionnaire focused on 
the usage of currency derivatives by Norwegian companies. They found out that 
the results from the Norwegian companies were consistent with other empirical 
findings. Almost every company, which had currency exposure, used some sort of 
currency hedging, where the most common hedging method was derivatives. Also 
larger firms in Norway tended to use more derivatives.  
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Methodology 
To answer our research question we decided to focus on non-financial firms at the 
Oslo Stock Exchange, which are approximately 170 companies in total. Instead of 
using a questionnaire, we will test our hypotheses by looking at annual reports of 
these companies for the year 2011. More specifically, we will analyse sections of 
annual reports concerning a) financial derivatives; b) executive compensation; and 
c) discussion of risk management. Since all of the companies have to follow 
international financial reporting standards (IFRS), there should be no problem in 
finding relevant information in annual reports. IFRS was first introduced on 
January 1, 2005 for all companies listed on stock exchanges in the EEA (EØS). 
According to this standard, companies must report their exposure to risk, the use 
of financial derivatives, management compensation, etc. In addition, we will 
research educational backgrounds of companies’ CEOs.  
 
In our master thesis we will run a cross-sectional regression. On the left-hand side 
we will try to measure the use of financial derivatives. On the right-hand side we 
will look at executive compensation (stock option, ownership stock and cash 
bonus compensation) and the education level of the CEO as the endogen 
variables. The compensation variables will be dummy variables in our regression.  
 
We will also include some control variables in the regression, so we do not get 
omitted variable problems. Control variables should be variables that may have an 
impact on the usage of financial derivatives. For example, we will include firm 
size and industry in our regression, since these are variables which we know we 
will find. We need to control for firm size (measured by total assets), since larger 
firms likely use more risk management than smaller firms. Also, firm size may 
affect education level of the CEO. We believe that the larger the company, the 
higher the education level of the CEO (something that needs to be tested). If we 
do not include firm size as a control variable, our regression will be biased as the 
education level of the CEO and the firm size probably correlate. We will also 
include a control variable which reflects the industry of specific companies. That 
is because education levels of the CEO and executive compensation schemes may 
vary across different industries.  
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We will be running a regression similar to: 
Use of financial derivatives_i = α + β*(executive compensation_i) + γ *(vector of 
control variable_i) + ε_i  
Where “i” refers to firm i.    
 
During our work with the master thesis, we may modify our regression and 
hypotheses depending on the information gathered from the annual reports, 
research articles and other sources. 
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